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THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
CAROLYN DAVIS, 
Plaintiff Appellant, 
vs. 
LAGOON CORPORATION, et al. 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 960364 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction in this matter in accordance with Article 
VIII, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated 78-2-2Q (1994 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues on appeal all relate to the trial court's action in granting the Defendants' 
Motion for Sanctions pursuant to Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Appellant 
contends that the trial court committed error in granting the Defendants' Motion, which included 
the dismissal of the Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice and relies upon three lines of reasoning to 
support her position. 
1. The Trial Court Committed Error in Granting the Defendants' Motion for 
Sanctions. Including the Dismissal of the Plaintiff's Complaint, Based Upon 
the Law and Facts Submitted to the Court, 
The first issue preserved by the Appellant is whether the trial court committed error in 
granting Defendants' Motion for Sanctions, including the dismissal of the Plaintiffs Complaint, 
based upon the law and facts submitted to the court. The Appellant preserved the issue by the 
filing of the Motion and Affidavit for Relief from Judgment and Order (Record 115-116, 117-
133). 
On appeal, this Court, in determining the propriety of the trial court's action, reviews the 
matter to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in the imposition of discovery sanctions. 
Utah Department of Transportation v. Osguthorpe. 259 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Utah 1995); 
Darrington v. Wade. 812 P 2d 452r 457 (Utah Ct App. 1981); Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 
Inc.. 790 P.2d 584, 585 (Utah Ct. App.), cerL_ denied 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). The review 
of the trial court's discretion must include the preference, where possible, for a full and complete 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the case. Heathman v. Fabien & Clendenin. 377 P.2d 
189. 190 (Utah 1962); Harmenv. Slavens. 546 R2d 601, 603 (Utah 1976). 
2. The Trial Court Committed Error in Dismissing the Plain tiffs Complaint 
Without Explicitly Finding that the Plaintiff as Opposed to Plaintiff's 
Counsel, was Guilty of Willfulness* Bad Faith or Fault 
The second issue raised on this appeal is whether the trial court committed error in 
dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint without explicitly finding that the Plaintiff, as opposed to 
PlaintiflPs counsel, was guilty of willfulness, bad faith or fault. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. 
Schamanek. 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan 
Hockey Clubr Inc.. 427 US 639, 640 (1976). The Plaintiff preserved the issue on appeal by the 
filing of a Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order with supporting Affidavit (R. 115-116, 
117,133). 
3. The Trail Court Committed Error in Denying the Plaintiff's Motion made 
Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to Set Aside 
the Court's Order Granting Sanctions, 
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The last issue raised by the Plaintiff on appeal is whether the trail court committed error in 
denying the Plaintiffs motion, made pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure to set aside the trial court's order granting sanctions. Conclusions of law made 
regarding a Rule 60(b) motion are accorded no particular deference and are reviewed for 
correctness. Richens v. Delbert Chipman & SonsT Co.. 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991); Scharfv. BMGCorp.. 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). The trial court's determination 
of whether to relieve a party from judgment is an act involving discretion and is reviewed by this 
Court on an "abuse of discretion" standard. Udyv. Udy. 893 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1995); Bischel v. 
Merritt, 278 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (Utah 1995). The Plaintiff preserved the issue by the filing of 
the motion for relief from judgment with supporting affidavit (R. 115-116, 117, 133). 
DISPOSITIVE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
In relevant part, Rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery, A party, upon reasonable notice 
to other parties and all persons affected thereby may apply for an order compelling 
discovery as follows: 
. . . (2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31 . . . or a party fails to answer an 
interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
an answer, or designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
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with the request. . . 
(b) Failure to Comply with Order. 
. . . (2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party 
or an officer, director or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 30(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under 
subdivision (a) of this Rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for 
the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party 
obtaining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from 
introducing designated matters in evidence; 
( C ) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
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order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such 
orders as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), ( C ) of this subdivision, 
unless the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to 
produce such person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or 
both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by 
the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified 
or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. . . 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows: 
(B) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) Mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or inexcusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 
trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, 
for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon the 
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defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said 
action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment in which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 
application; or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), 
(2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding 
was entered or taken . . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Plaintiff filed this action against the Defendants seeking to recover damages for the 
serious and permanent injury she sustained, including brain damage, as a result of an incident that 
occurred on July 14, 1991, when the Plaintiff was a patron of the Lagoon amusement park. 
Inasmuch as the dismissal of this case and the issues raised on appeal relate solely to the 
procedural chronology of the case, the Appellant will limit the Statement of Facts to that area. 
1. Former counsel for the Plaintiff, Richard M. Hutchins, Esq., filed the Plaintiffs 
Complaint in July of 1993 in Utah County, when none of the Defendants resided in that county 
and no statutory basis for the filing in Utah County was stated in the Complaint (R. 3-6) 
2. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative, a motion for change of 
venue which was ultimately granted by Judge Guy R. Burningham of the Fourth District on 
February 2, 1994 (R. 7-9, 25). 
3. The Defendants filed an answer to the Plaintiffs Complaint on March 8, 1994 (R. 26-
29). On March 15, 1994, the Defendants filed with the Court a Certificate of Service certifying 
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that on March 14, 1994 the Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production 
of Documents were mailed to Plaintiffs counsel (R. 30). 
4. On October 17,1994, the Defendants filed a motion to compel discovery alleging that 
the Plaintiff had failed to respond to the discovery requests sent in February of 1994 and failed to 
respond to follow-up letters sent by counsel for the Defendants regarding discovery on May 21, 
1994 and August 25, 1994 (R. 31-55). 
5. Plaintiffs counsel failed to respond to the discovery requests of the Defendants and 
failed to respond to the Defendants' motion to compel. Accordingly, on November 8, 1994, a 
notice to submit the Defendants' motion to compel was filed by the Defendants (R. 56-57). On 
November 4, 1994, Judge Rodney S. Page signed an Order granting the Defendants' motion to 
compel and ordering the Plaintiff to respond to the Defendants' Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents within 24 hours of the Court's Order (R. 60-63). 
6. After Plaintiffs counsel failed to respond to the Court's Order, the Defendants filed a 
motion and memorandum for sanctions in accordance with Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on November 22, 1994 (R. 60-66). 
7. Again, Plaintiffs counsel failed to respond to the motion for sanctions filed by the 
Defendants and a Notice to Submit was filed by the Defendants requesting the trial court's ruling 
on the Rule 37(b) motion of the Defendants on January 19, 1995 (R. 67-68). 
8. On January 13, 1995, the matter came before the Court by way of an emergency 
telephone conference. As a result of that conference, the Court entered the following Order 
which was signed by Judge Michael G. Allphin on January 24,1995. In relevant part, the Order 
reads as follows: 
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1. Mr. Hutchins be, and hereby is granted leave to withdraw as counsel 
of record for the plaintiff; 
2. The plaintiff has 10 days from and after January 13, 1995, in which 
to have another attorney enter an appearance as counsel of record; 
3. If, within 10 days from and after January 13, 1995, the plaintiff has 
not had another attorney enter an appearance as counsel of record, Mr. 
Henderson, counsel for the defendant, is to file a Motion for the plaintiff to 
appear or appoint counsel; 
4. If, within 30 days from and after Mr. Henderson filing the 
aforementioned Motion for plaintiff to appear or appoint counsel, plaintiff 
has not either appeared or appointed counsel, the Court will, at that point, 
seriously entertain the pending Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice for violation 
of the Court's prior discovery Order in this case. 
R. 73-75. 
9. On March 2, 1995, after Plaintiffs counsel, Mr. Richard M. Hutchins had failed to 
withdraw as counsel and new counsel had not appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff, the Defendants 
filed a Motion renewing their request for sanctions pursuant to Rule 36(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure (R. 81 -89). On March 31, 1995, the Defendants filed a Notice to Submit with 
the Clerk of the Court regarding their renewed motion for sanctions (R 91-92). 
10. On March 31, 1995, Judge Page signed a Ruling which provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
. . . the Court has heretofore granted the Defendants' motion to compel 
and order that the Plaintiff comply with discovery requests previously submitted 
and is further required that the Plaintiff appear or appoint counsel within a 
specified time after allowing Plaintiffs counsel to withdraw and the Plaintiff 
having failed to respond to discovery as previously ordered by the Court and 
having failed to appear either in person or by counsel as required by the Court, 
the Court hereby dismisses Plaintiffs Complaint with prejudice. 
Defendants' counsel is to prepare findings and judgment in accordance 
with the Court's ruling and submit the same to the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs former 
counsel at least 5 days prior to the time they are submitted to the Court for 
signature. 
R. 93-94. 
11. On April 7, 1995, present counsel for the Plaintiff, Randy S. Kester entered his 
appearance as counsel for the Plaintiff (R. 95-96). On April 17, 1995, new counsel for the 
Plaintiff filed an objection to the proposed findings and judgment (R. 97-98). 
12. Finally, on May 19, 1995, former counsel for the Plaintiff, Richard Hutchins, Esq., 
withdrew as counsel for the Plaintiff (R. 103-104). 
13. On June 8, 1995, new counsel for the Plaintiff submitted Interrogatories and Request 
for Production of Documents to the Defendants (110-111). 
14. On March 11, 1996, counsel for the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment 
and Order based upon Rule 60(b)(7) (R. 115-116). In counsel's aflBdavit submitted in support of 
the Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order, Mr. Kester stated the following relevant facts. 
In March of 1995, the Plaintiff contacted Mr. Kester and indicated that she had an action pending 
and that her former attorney had indicated his intent to withdraw but apparently had not done so. 
Accordingly, Mr. Kester filed an Entry of Appearance on April 7, 1995. On April 12, 1995, Mr. 
Kester received a copy of counsel for the Defendants' proposed findings and judgment based 
upon the Court's ruling. Mr. Kester immediately called the Court and filed a formal objection to 
the findings. The hearing on the Plaintiffs objection was continued by the Court. Mr. Kester, on 
behalf of the Plaintiff indicated his intent to immediately comply to all of the Court's prior orders 
and act diligently on the behalf of the Plaintiff. 
15. On July 22, 1996, the Court signed an Order denying the Plaintiffs objection to the 
proposed findings and judgment and order denying Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(7) motion for relief from 
judgment (R. 172-174). 
16. On August 22, 1996, Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal (R. 182-183). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court committed error in granting the Defendants' 
request for dismissal of the Plaintiffs Complaint under the facts and circumstances of this case. 
Specifically, the trial court should have made findings with regard to the conduct of Plaintiffs 
counsel as compared with the conduct of the Plaintiff. Further, the trial court should have 
allowed new counsel for the Plaintiff a reasonable time to comply with the Court's prior orders 
regarding discovery. By failing to differentiate between the wrongfiil conduct of Plaintiff s former 
counsel and the conduct of the Plaintiff, the Plaintiff has been denied her right to have her case 
determined on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING 
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THE PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT UNDER THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
A. The Law Interpreting Ride 37(fr) pf the Utah Rules pf Civil Procedure. 
As noted by the Court in First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. SchamaneL 684 P.2d 1257, 
1266 (Utah 1984), 
The general rule is that a party in a civil case who refused to respond to 
an order compelling discovery is subject to sanctions pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 
37(b)(2)(C) . . . . The sanctions are intended to deter misconduct in connection 
with discovery . . . and require a showing of'Svillfulness, bad faith, or fault" on 
the part of the non-complying party . . . the choice of an appropriate discovery 
sanction is primarily the responsibility of the trial judge and will not be reversed 
absent an abuse of discretion. (Citations omitted). 
Utah case law is clear that although the imposition of sanctions is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, the dismissal of 
an action requires an explicit finding of the trial court of 'Svillfulness, bad faith, or fault." Id. The 
requirement of definitive findings regarding willfulness is consistent with this Court's 
determination that: 
The striking of pleadings, entering of default, and rendering of judgment 
against the disobedient party are the most severe of the potential sanctions that 
can be imposed upon a non-responding party. [Because of the severity of this 
type of sanction], the trial court's range of discretion is more narrow than when 
the trial court is imposing less severe sanctions. 
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Osguthorpe, supra at 7-8; Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 514 (Utah 1996). 
This Court, in its decisions has referred to federal law interpreting the identical provision 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 961 
(Utah App. 1988); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. supra at 1266 (quoting Society Internationale v. 
Rogers. 357 U.S. 197 (1958). In accordance with federal law, Utah courts have determined 
C4willful failure to mean "any intention of failure as distinguished from involuntary non-
compliance." Arnica Mut. Ins. Co.. supra at 961; M.E.N. Co. v. Fluids, Inc.. 854 P.2d 869, 
873 (9th Cir. 1973). Federal cases are clear that findings must appear in the lower court's 
opinion in sufficient detail to indicate the factual basis for its ultimate conclusion. Colorado 
Flving Co.. Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871, 878 (10th Cir. 1984), £grL_ denied. 476 U.S. 
1182(1986). SeealsQA. Charles A. Wright & Author R. Miller Federal Practice and 
Procedure. Section 2291 (1994). 
B. The Facts as Applied to the Law of this Case. 
After the Notice of Appeal was filed in this matter, the Plaintiff prepared and filed an 
affidavit in support of the motion to set the court's order aside. A copy of the PlaintifFs affidavit 
is attached as the Addendum to this Brief. In the PlaintifFs affidavit, the Plaintiff testifies that she 
had no knowledge of the facts surrounding the improper filing of the PlaintifFs complaint. The 
Plaintiff relates that she never received a copy of the Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories and 
Request for Production of Documents that were sent to Mr. Hut chins, her former counsel, in 
March of 1994. 
The Plaintiff recites in her affidavit that she called Mr. Hutchins on a regular basis and was 
neither told that the discovery responses were delinquent nor that counsel for the Defendants had 
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written several follow-up letters regarding discovery. The Plaintiff was not advised of the 
Defendants' filing of the motion to compel, the order of the court requiring Plaintiffs responses 
to the discovery within 24 hours of the court's order or the Defendants' renewed motion for 
sanctions submitted in November of 1994. The Plaintiff was not advised of the emergency 
conference call with counsel conducted on January 13, 1995 and had no knowledge that she had 
only ten days to hire another attorney. 
When the Plaintiff received the notice to appoint counsel, she had not been informed that 
Mr. Hutchins had withdrawn as counsel. The record supports the Plaintiffs memory in that the 
withdrawal of counsel by Mr. Hutchins was not filed until May 19, 1995 (R. 103-104). When the 
Plaintiff called Mr. Hutchins' office, after receiving the notice to appoint, the Plaintiff was told 
that Mr. Hutchins was attending to the matter and not to be concerned with the notice. 
The Plaintiff indicates in her affidavit that she retained new counsel, not because she had 
been advised of any court orders but because she was concerned with the manner in which Mr. 
Hutchins was handling her matter (see Addendum). 
The Plaintiffs recitation of facts as set out in her affidavit is entirely consistent with the 
record in the case. After receiving the Defendants' interrogatories and request for production of 
documents on or about March 15, 1994, Mr. Hutchins did not request any extension of time to 
respond or take any other action to avoid the 30 day deadline set out in Rules 26 and 34 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Mr. Hutchins did not file any documents with the court indicating 
that he was having any problems with his claim. 
After the Defendants filed their motion to compel on March 17, 1994, Mr. Hutchins failed 
to file any response. Mr. Hutchins could have requested additional time, could have withdrawn 
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from the case or relayed the specific reasons why he had failed to comply with the Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Instead, Mr. Hutchins did nothing. Mr. Hutchins failed to respond to the initial 
motion to compel filed on October 17, 1994, the Rule 37(b) motion for sanctions filed on 
November 22, 1994, the court's order signed on January 24, 1995, the order of dismissal signed 
on February 21, 1995, the renewed motion for sanctions on March 2, 1995 and the ruling of 
Judge Page on March 31, 1995. Clear evidence of Mr. Hutchins' incompetence is the fact that 
although he was given permission by the court to withdraw from the case on January 13, 1995, he 
waited until May 19, 1995, over four months, to file his withdrawal. 
Even without the Plaintiffs affidavit, the record reveals that Mr. Hutchins simply did not 
fulfil his obligations as Plaintiffs counsel. Mr. Hutchins had an independent duty to the court and 
opposing counsel to respond in some fashion to the letters from opposing counsel, the numerous 
motions filed by the Defendants and the court's orders. Mr. Hutchins simply failed to give the 
Plaintiffs case any attention and allowed sanctions to be granted against the Plaintiff without ever 
advising the Plaintiff of the existence of the controversy regarding discovery. 
In sum, although the trial court has considerable discretion in setting sanctions regarding 
discovery, the range of discretion is narrowed considerably when the ultimate sanction of 
dismissal is imposed by the court. When the trial court elects to employ dismissal, the court must 
substantiate its use of that sanction by a clear finding of willfulness, bad faith or fault. In this case, 
other than reciting the failure of the Plaintiff to respond to discovery and the motions filed by the 
Defendants, the court made no findings regarding willfulness, bad faith or fault (R. 172-174). 
Further, the court failed to even comment in the distinction between the comment of Plaintiffs 
counsel who never adequately informed the Plaintiff of the status of her case. 
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It is respectfully submitted that under this Court's interpretation of Rule 37 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiffs case 
based upon the clear misconduct of Plaintiffs former counsel (of which the Plaintiff had no 
knowledge) and based upon the fact that the court failed to make the requisite findings regarding 
willfulness, bad faith or fault. 
POINT H: THE PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER REINSTATING 
HER COMPLAINT BASED UPON RULE 60 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. General Analysis of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 60(b)(1) and (7) of th Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the 
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect... (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgement.. . . 
The Utah Appellate Courts have ruled in several cases that are helpful in resolving the 
issues raised by the Plaintiffs motion. In Valley Leasing v. Houghton- 661 P.2d (Utah 1983), the 
Court dealt with the defendant's motion to be relieved from judgment when he failed to appeal 
after his attorney had withdrawn. In that case, the Court noted that Rule 60(b)(1) URCP allows a 
court to relieve a party form judgment on a showing of excusable neglect and that "such relief is 
to be /iberally granted." (Emphasis added). Id. At 960. The Court sustained the trial court's 
finding denying relief to the defendant because the defendant had known for nearly a year that his 
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counsel had withdrawn and knew of the trial date and chose to send his wife to represent him. Id 
In State of Utah v. Musselman. 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1983), the Court restated its policy: 
[W]e are in accord generally with the doctrine urged by defendant that the 
courts should be liberal in granting relief against judgments taken by default to the 
end that controversies may be tried on the merits. 
Id. at 1055; See al§Q, Mason v. Mason. 597 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1979). 
In Katzv. Pierce. 743 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986), the Court added that "where there is doubt 
about whether a default should be set aside, that doubt should be resolved in favor of doing 
so." (Emphasis added). M. at 93. As summarized by the Court in Richins v. Delbert Chipman 
& Sons Co.. 817 P.2d 382 fUtah App. 1991): 
In order for a party to be relieved form judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), the 
party must demonstrate not only that the judgment resulted form mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, but also that the motion to set aside 
was timely, and that there exists issues worthy of adjudication. 
Id. 
Although Utah courts have not dealt extensively with the issue of attorney neglect and 
Rule 60(b), the Court in Lincoln Benefit Life Assurance Co. v. D.T. Southern Properties. 838 
P.2d 672 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) held an allegation by a movant that attorney neglect was the 
cause of the entry of judgment constitutes a Rule 60(b)(1) motion to be made within three months 
of the entry of judgment. Id. The holding does establish that the Utah Appellate Courts 
recognize that neglect on the part of a party may, in fact, be used as a basis for seeking relief 
under Rule 60(b)(1) URCP. 
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In Ericksonv. Schenkers. 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), the Court explicitly held that in 
considering whether an issue is meritorious, the trial court should be guided by the following: 
A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default judgment set aside if 
it is entitled to be tried. Once timeliness and a basis for relief under Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure have been established, the sole issue is 
whether, as a matter of law, a defendant's proposed answer contains a 
defense which is entitled to be tried. (Emphasis added). 
Id. See also. Udy v. Udy. supra. 
B. Analysis of Federal Law Interpreting Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
The Federal Courts have been much more active in determining the scope of relief 
available to a litigant based upon the neglect of a person's own attorney. 
In applying Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to cases involving 
judgments or orders entered as a result of the conduct of a party's attorney, the general axiom has 
been established that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the motion to set aside the 
judgment in order to allow the case to be heard on the merits. In Re Estate of Cremidas- 18 FR 
Ser. 60b. 29, Case 3, 14 FRD 15 (D Alaska 1953). 
There are a limited number of case relating to judgments entered as a result of the 
conduct of a party's attorney. However, relief has been granted in cases involving: 
(A) the attorney's drunkenness, In Re Estate of Cremidas, supra: (B) improper 
handling of negotiations, Barbery. Tuberville. 210 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1954); ( C) 
unexplained departure of counsel from practice, Minneapolis Brewing Co. v. 
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Meffllt, 143F. Supp. 146 (D.N.D. 1956): Seven Elves. Inc. v. EskenazL 635 
F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981); (D) death of a co-defendant, Foley v. U.S.. 645 F.2d 
155 (2nd Cir. 1981); (E) attorney changing address and lack of awareness pending 
motion, Bloisv. Friday. 612 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1980); (F) plaintiffs absence from 
trial based upon attorney's misconduct, Peterson v. Term Taxi Co.. 429 F.2d 888 
(2nd Cir. 1970); (G) withdrawl of cousel without advise to client or court, 
Jackson v. Beech. 636 F.2d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1980); (H) clear negject of an action 
by an attorney, Bougherv. Sec'y H.E.W.. 572 F.2d 976 (3rd Cir. 1978). 
Of the cases cited above, several have particular application to the specific facts of this 
case. The Appellate Court in Bloisv. Friday, supra specifically reversed a ruling on summary 
judgment when the failure to respond to the motion was due to counsel's error. Chagert v. 
Wheatley. 392 F. Supp. 62 (D. VI1975). In Seven Elves. Inc. supra, the Court granted relief 
where the defendant's failure to appeal resulted form the clients reliance on their part and the 
attorney's subsequent withdrawal from the case without notifying his clients or following the 
Court's rules with regard to withdrawal of counsel. In Boughner v. Sec'y of H.E.W.. supra, the 
district court denied the plaintiff's motion to vacate summary judgment when the plaintiffs 
original attorney had failed to oppose the motion for summary judgment because of his 
involvement in a judicial campaign, a large back load of cases and a loss of a secretary. The 
Court of Appeals reversed the district court's ruing finding that the neglect, although not 
excusable under Rule 60(b)(1) FRCP, was so gross as to be inexcusable constituting an 
exceptional and extraordinary basis to mandate relief under Rule 60(b)(6) FRCP. Likewise, in 
Jackson v. Monthly Co.. 569 F.2d 119 (CA DC 1979), the Court of Appeals reversed the district 
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court's ruling denying a motion for reinstatement of plaintiffs claims finding that the attorney 
involved may have been grossly negligent toward his client and that a serious dereliction by an 
attorney, unaccompanied by a similar default by a client, may furnish a basis for relief under Rule 
60(b)(7) FRCP. See alSQ, United States v. Cirmai. 563 F.2d 26 (CA 2nd 1977). 
Even the circuits where a more restrictive view has been taken, the Plaintiff is entitled to 
have her complaint reinstated. In Pelican Production Corp. v. Marino. 893 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 
1990), the 10th Circuit Court addressed the issue. In that case, the district court had entered a 
default judgment of dismissal against Pelican after it had failed to respond to motions to dismiss 
and for summary judgment. After the entry of the judgment, an attorney appearing on behalf of 
Pelican explained to the court that Mr. Wilkens, Pelican's lawyer in the case, had not responded 
to the motions because he was phasing out his law practice to start an oil company. New counsel 
for Pelican filed a motion for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In support of its motion, Pelican alleged: 
1. That it had received no notice from Wilkens, its attorney, of the motion to 
dismiss; 
2. That it had no communication from Wilkens on the matter; and 
3. That it had not learned of the entry of the judgment until approximately 
one month after its entry. 
Id. at 1144-45. 
Marino, in opposition, contended that the present action was just one of twelve actions 
brought by the plaintiff against the defendant and that two of the prior actions had been dismissed 
and judgment in two others had been confessed. The district court denied Pelican's motion to set 
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aside, stating that there had been no showing of excusable neglect and that Rule 60(b) was not to 
be used a sa vehicle for "attorney's carelessness." Id. At 1145. 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit Court held, in reviewing the issue of whether the district 
court had abused its discretion as follows: 
Carelessness by a litigant or his counsel does afford a basis for relief 
under Rule 60(b)(1). Ben Stager Chems. v. E. Targosz&Co.. 560 F.2d 
805 (7th Cir. 1977). We know of no reason that the failure of Pelican's 
lawyer, Jack Wilkens, to answer the motion to dismiss would be excusable. 
Perhaps an excuse would be offered if we had his affidavit on his reason for not 
responding, but we do not. ccParties desiring relief must particularize, 
and generally do not acquit themselves of responsibility by showing merely that 
they placed the case in the hands of another attorney [citing source]. 
Id. at 1146. 
In this case, the Court has the particularization required by the Tenth Circuit. The Court 
has the affidavit of the Plaintiff and the representations of Defendants' counsel. There is no 
question that the interrogatories, request to produce, motion to compel and other critical 
documents were mailed to Plaintiffs counsel. The record is clear that Mr. Hutchins did not 
respond to the same over a period that certainly constitutes a clear case of neglect. The file is 
replete with Mr. Hutchins' failure to properly represent the Plaintiff and when he chose to 
withdraw from the case instead of fact he consequence of his neglect, his office misrepresented 
the status of the case ot the Plaintiff. There is no question that Mr. Hutchins mishandled the 
Plaintiffs case and the evidence supporting that conclusion is documented by the Court's own file 
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and supplemented by the Plaintiffs affidavit. As it relates to the Plaintiffs responsibility, the 
evidence in uncontroverted. The Plaintiff maintained regular contact with her attorney and made 
the appropriate inquiries. The Plaintiff was specifically told the case was proceeding normally. 
When the Plaintiff received the withdrawal of counsel, she was given inappropriate advise by Mr. 
Hutchins' office. In essence, the Plaintiff and the Court were victims of Mr. Hutchins' 
misrepresentations and failure to comply with the basic standards of competence. The record of 
the Plaintiffs lack of culpability certainly meets the requirements of the Court's decision in 
Marino. The Court must also keep in mind that the Plaintiff in this case is a lay person, as 
opposed to a corporation, with corporate counsel. 
The effect of a factual scenario where the party is a lay person and totally innocent of the 
misdeeds of their attorney is discussed in Agusta Fiberglass Coatings v. Fodor Contracting Corp.. 
843 F.2d 808 (4th Cir. 1988). In that case, the court was trying to resolve two different results 
in cases involving the same issue of defaults caused by an attorney's mishandling of a case. 
This focus on the source of the default represents an equitable balance 
between our preference for trial on the merits and the judicial system's need for 
finality and efficiency in litigation. When the party is blameless and the attorney 
is at fault, the former interests control and a default judgment should 
ordinarily be set aside. When a party is at fault, the latter interests dominate 
and the party must adequately defend its conduct in order to show excusable 
neglect. 
Applying these principles to the present case, the district court erred 
because it failed to distinguish between the fault of Fodor's attorney and the 
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fault, if any, of Fodor itself. . . . 
Id. at 811-12. 
The Court in Agusta. required a showing that relief wa sought quickly, that there was not 
prejudice to the other party and that there was some showing of a meritorious defense. 
. . . This circuit has taken the general position that "carelessness by a 
litigant or his counsel does not afford a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1)" 
[citing Marino]... At the same time, the Tenth Circuit has left open the 
possibility that a client might demonstrate excusable neglect if she were '"wholly 
innocent in the matter in failing to respond . . . " [citing Marino and Agusta] 
. . . Notwithstanding the gross neglect of plaintifFs former counsel at Turner and 
Boisseau, the court finds that plaintiff should be allowed to file her reply out of 
time . . . Plaintiff was not merely the recipient of an isolated incident of negligent 
representation, which normally binds the client [citing cases]. To the contrary, 
the uncontested evidence in the record indicates that after Mr. McKinney's 
departure, plaintiff did not merely sit idly during this time, but repeatedly 
contacted her nominal counsel. . . Thus, not only was plaintiff 'Vholly innocent," 
but plaintiff did all that can be reasonably expected . . . . 
The facts of this case establish that the Plaintiff herein, was also completely abandoned by 
Mr. Hutchins. As in McCoy, supra, the Plaintiff in this case did not sit idly by. The Plaintiff made 
continual inquiries of counsel and simply did not have any reason to suspect the events and 
conduct that led to the granting of the Defendants' motion and the dismissal of her case. 
C. Analysis of the Facts of this Case. 
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If a complete review of the facts of this case is made, it is clear that Mr. Hutchins failed to 
comply with even basic duties owed to he Court and to the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff was never 
advised that there were problems with regard to discovery and that the issue of discovery had 
grown to a magnitude which jeopardized her action. 
Although the Court allowed Mr. Hutchins to escape from the case, the events which took 
place thereafter are confusing to say the least. Mr. Henderson, on January 27, 1995, sent a 
Notice to Appoint Counsel which stated as follows: 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-51-36 and the Honorable Rodney 
S. Page's Order of January 13, 1995, Plaintiff Carolyn Davis is hereby given 
written notice to appoint another attorney or appear in person. 
To a lay person, the notice would have made some sense if Mr. Hutchins had actually 
withdrawn from the case. It was not until May 19, 1995, that Mr. Hutchins actually filed a 
Withdrawal of Counsel. The Plaintiff sought the advise of new counsel in March of 1995, simply 
because she wanted an independent opinion as to how Mr. Hutchins was handling the case. After 
present counsel entered an appearance, he did everything to try and expedite the handling of the 
case. 
It is respectfully submitted that the only prejudice suffered by the Defendants in reinstating 
the Plaintiffs Complaint is that of costs associated with the numerous motions filed regarding 
discovery. This Court, can fully reimburse the Defendants by assessing costs against Mr. 
Hutchins who is solely responsible for the delay an mishandling of the case. 
Under the prevailing law, it would be an injustice to punish the Plaintiff who had acted 
appropriately on an officer of the Court to handle her matter. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the limited discretion which the trial court retains in dismissing the Plaintiffs 
Complaint and the failure of the trial court to make specific findings of willfulness, bad faith or 
fault, the order dismissing the Plaintiffs Complaint was improper under Rule 37 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Further, based upon Mr. Hutchins' clear failure to fulfil his obligation to the 
Plaintiff, defense counsel and the court, any sanctions granted in this case should be entered 
against Mr. Hutchins and not against the Plaintiff who is simply seeking to recover for serious 
injuries incurred at the Defendants' amusement park. 
DATED this p day of November, 1996. 
Randy S. Kester, E&%. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that two copies of Appellant's Brief was mailed, postage prepaid, to Mr. Robert 
H. Henderson, Esq., 10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, Post Office Box 45000, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84145-5000, this V^-day of November, 1996. 
24 
ADDENDUM 
A D D E N D U M 
Exhibit A: Affidavit of Plaintiff. 
RANDY S. KESTER, ESQ. #4357 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Telephone: (801) 489-3294 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
800 West State, Farmington, Utah 84025 
CAROLYN DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAGOON CORPORATION, et al., 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF"S AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SET 
SIDE ORDER 
Case No. 940700045PI 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
) 
: SS. 
) 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
The Plaintiff, Carolyn Davis, after first being duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above referenced case. 
2. I had no knowledge that Mr. Hutchins filed the 
Plaintiff's Complaint in July of 1993 in the wrong county. 
3. Mr. Hutchins did not advise me that he received the 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for 
Production of Documents on or about March 15, 1994. 
4. Although I called Mr. Hutchins on a regular basis, at 
least once or twice a month, I was not informed that follow-up 
letters were sent by counsel for the Defendant regarding 
discovery on May 21, 1994 and August 25, 1994. 
5. I was not advised by Mr. Hutchins that, on October 17, 
1994, a Motion to Compel was filed by counsel for the Defendant 
based upon the Plaintiff's failure to respond to discovery. 
6. I was not advised by Mr. Hutchins that on November 4, 
1994, the Court signed an Order compelling discovery requiring 
the Plaintiff to fully and completely answer Lagoon's First Set 
of Interrogatories to the Plaintiff within 24 hours of the 
Court's Order. 
7. I was not advised by Mr. Hutchins that on November 22, 
1994, counsel for thq. Defendant filed a Motion for Sanctions 
requesting that the Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed based upon 
the failure of Plaintiff's counsel to comply with the Court's 
Order dated November 4, 1994. 
8. I was never advised by Mr. Hutchins that on January 13, 
1995, a conference call was conducted between counsel and the 
Court and at that time, Mr. Hutchins requested the right to 
withdraw as my counsel. I had no knowledge that I was given ten 
days from January 13, 1995 in which to have another attorney 
enter an appearance as counsel of record. 
9. On January 27, 1995, I received a Notice to Appoint 
Attorney or Appear in Person. At that time I had not been 
informed by Mr. Hutchins that he had withdrawn as counsel for me 
and that I was required to undertake any further action with 
regard to hiring another lawyer. 
10. When I called Mr Hutchins' office, I was told not to be 
concerned with the Notice in that Mr Hutchins was attending to 
the matter. I was not informed that on March 2, 1995, counsel 
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for the Defendant renewed his Motion for Sanctions under Rule 
37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
11. In March of 1995 I contacted and retained Mr. Kester 
because I did not feel that Mr. Hutchins was moving my case along 
or that he was communicating with me about the matter. Only 
after I retained Mr. Kester did I learn of all of the improper 
conduct by Mr. Hutchins. 
12. I am in a position to cooperate and provide all of the 
necessary information required by the Defendant in this case. At 
all times, I have been willing to fully cooperate with requests 
of the Defendant had I known of their existence. 
Dated this /? day of'^ fttr^ Ist, 1996. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / 2^. day of 
1996. 
^ 
Notary Public f 
My Commission Expires: <y '** ^7 I Reside At: ^ ^ ^ - ^ * ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the /j}^ day of AugSst, 1996, I 
mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the entity 
listed below. 
Robert H. Henderson,Esq. 
Attorney for Defendant 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Lagoon Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN DAVIS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LAGOON CORPORATION, et al., 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER 
DENYING OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 
60(b)(7) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940700045 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
Notice is hereby given that on July 22nd, 1996, The Honorable Rodney S. Page signed 
the Order Denying Objection to Proposed Findings and Judgment and Order Denying 
Plaintiff's Rule 60(b)(7) Motion for Relief From Judgment in the form attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. 
DATED this & 
r 
day of August, 1996, 
SNOW, RT1NEAU 
Robert H. Henderson 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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ROBERT H. HENDERSON (A1461) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Lagoon Corporation 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN DAVIS, ORDER DENYING OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND 
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT AND ORDER DENYING 
PLAINTIFF'S RULE 60(b)(7) MOTION 
vs. FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT 
LAGOON CORPORATION, et ah. Civil No. 940700045 
Defendants. Judge Rodney S. Page 
On June 18, 1996, Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Findings and Judgment and 
Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(7) Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order came on regularly for a 
hearing. The defendant was represented by Robert H. Henderson of the law firm Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau. The plaintiff was represented by Randy S. Kester of the law firm 
Young & Kester. The Court had previously reviewed the entire file. The Court fully heard 
the argument of counsel. The Court is fully advised in the premises. 
The Court notes the procedural history of this case, including, but not limited to: 
11-21-1996 3:43PM FROM YOUNG, KESTER. PETRO 801 489 3298 P. B 
Plaintiffs Complaint was filed in July, 1993, in the wrong county. A Motion for 
Change of Venue was made in November, 1993 and an Order changing venue was signed in 
February, 1994-
An Answer was filed in March, 1994 and on March 15, 1994 the defendants sent 
plaintiff Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents. No Responses were 
forthcoming. There were letters of May 21, and of August 25 of 1994 to plaintiffs counsel 
requesting those matters. No Responses were received. In Occober of 1994 a Motion to 
Compel was filed by the defendant. Subsequently a Notice to Submit was filed on that on 
November 8, 1994
 7 when no Responses were forthcoming. On November 8 the Court ordered 
that the plaintiff comply within 24 hours. No Response was forthcoming. On November 22 
again, a Motion to Compel. Again, no Responses. On January 13, 1995, there was a 
conference call between defendant's counsel and plaintiffs counsel in which plaintiffs counsel 
requested to withdraw. The Court allowed that, and allowed the plaintiff ten days in which to 
retain another attorney in the case. Further that the defendant was to file a Motion to Appear 
or Appoint Counsel within 30 days. Notice to Appoint Counsel was filed on January 27, 
1995, No Response was received on that. 
On March 2, 1995, a Motion for Sanctions for Failure to Appear or Appoint Counsel 
was filed to the court and on April 3, 1995 the Court issued its Ruling Dismissing for Failure 
to Respond to Discovery. 
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The Court finds that the plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Findings and Judgment is 
without merit, and that the plaintiff has failed to identify any "unusual or exceptional" 
circumstances justifying Rule 60(b)(7) relief, or to bring such Motion within a "reasonable" 
time. 
Based thereon, NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1, Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Findings and Judgment be, and hereby is denied; 
2. Plaintiffs Rule 60(b)(7) Motion for Relief from Judgment and Order be, and 
hereby is denied. 
The Court will forthwith sign and enter the Findings and Judgment submitted by 
Lagoon's counsel in April of 1995, pursuant to the Court's ruling dated March 3l7 1995. 
DATED this 3 2 ^ day of J J L , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
RODNEY Si PAGE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form prior to entry: 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Randy S. £fesj^ r 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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AFFIDAVIT OF MAILTNG 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:$s 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Donna L. Campbell, being duly sworn, says that she is employed in the law office of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau, attorneys for defendant Lagoon Corporation herein; that she 
served the attached NOTICE OF ENTRY OF ORDER DENYING OBJECTION TO 
PROPOSED FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT AND ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S RULE 
60(b)(7) MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT (Civil No. 940700045 Second Judicial 
District Court for Davis County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed below by placing a true 
and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Richard M. Hutchins 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
40 East St. George Boulevard, Suite 300 
St. George, Utah 84770-2852 
Randy S. Kester 
YOUNG & KESTER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
101 East 200 South 
Sprtngville, Utah 84663 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the J_ day of August, 
1996. 
Donna L. Campbell 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this (^ day of August, 1996. 
Cor ing 1 \ C7iJn 
NOTARY PUBLIC j 
Residing in the State of Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
^tjli 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CONNIE R. CALO 
10 E*chang& Place, 11th F\r. 
Sail Lake City. Utah 64111 
My Commission £xplrt» 
September 2, 19d7 
STATE OF UTAH 
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R C E O u K*RTtNeA<j 
h. JAMES CLEOO 
DAVID W. Sl_ACH_£ 
A. DENNIS NORTON 
JOMM K. OATtS 
R. BRENT STEPHENS 
r,t* R WILSON 
MigMACL R. CM«t-STON 
DAVID G. WILUAMS 
REX E. MAOSEW 
MAX D W M E E L E R 
POOCRT M. HENDERSON 
STEPHEN J, WIUL 
OAVID W. SLAUGHTER 
STArtuEY J. RRESTON 
J O Y c. CL£<lct 
SHAWN E, 0»ANCY 
JOriN R. LUND 
RYAN £. T«Be«TTS 
ANNE 3WENSEN 
R O D N E Y R. PARKER 
RICHARD A. VAN WAOONCB 
ROOERT C. KEct-ER 
SCOTT O A N I E U S 
ANDREW M. MORiiC 
CAMH.UC N, JOHNSON 
RICK J . HALL 
TERENCE L. ROONCY 
DENNIS V. DAHLE 
KOREY O. RASMUS&EN 
H A R R Y M. S O U V / A L L 
DAVID L, PINKSTON 
JULIAMNE BLANCH 
BRIAN P MILLER 
JUDfTH O- WOLPCRTS 
ANTONIO ANAYA 
LAW O F F I C E S 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MAETINEAU 
A P R O F E S S I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N 
IO CXCHAWCe PLACE, E L E V C W T H F L O O B 
POST OFFICE BOX 4 3 0 0 0 
SALT L A K E CITY, UTAH 8 4 I 4 5 - 5 Q O O 
T E L E P H O N E (SOI) S2i -9Coo 
FACSIMILE (SOI) 3 6 3 - 0 4 0 0 
RECEIVED 
AUG 91996 
T H U R M A N $. 5UTWt;BLAND 
TMURMAN, SUTHERLAND & KING 
S^EGN. T M U R M A N , WOR3LCY C 3NOW 
WORSLEY. SNOW & CHRISTCWSEN 
JOHN H SNOW(fti7 i&ao 
August 6, 1996 
o r covMSCL 
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Randy S. Kester 
Young & Kester 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah $4663 
Re: Carolyn Davis v. Lagoon Corporation 
Dear Randy: 
In my August 6, 1996 mail I received the Order signed by the judge on July 22nd. The 
envelope mailing the Order to me is postmarked August 5th. Sorry for the delay since July 
22, but I am not responsible for the delay. 
Very truly yours, 
SNOW, CHRISTENING MARTINEAU 
eriderson 
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Enclosure 
